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Introduction 
As the economies of West Germany and former East Germany become 
progressively, if slowly, integrated, questions are being raised as to the 
competences of German managers from the east. At first glance, any such 
doubts would appear to be inappropriate. After all, East Germany provided the 
show-case economy of the COMECON countries and, so the argument runs, if 
the country’s managers could make communism work then they should 
encounter few problems in the market economy. 
But this contention ignores the special circumstances in which former East 
German managers were educated, and above all the way in which major 
enterprises were run. It also ignores some of the latest evidence on the 
competence of East German managers emerging from the west of the newly- 
reunited country. 
Philosophy of education 
The whole of the education system in former East Germany was predicated on 
the state’s claim to the right of the education of children within the socialist 
world order. The education of children was not a parental right (1). Since the 
state was defined as: ‘The political organisation of workers led by the working 
class and its Marxist-Leninist Party (2),” the nature of the education to which all 
children were exposed, including future managers, was heavily influenced by the 
tenets of socialism. 
The state also claimed the unity of education and the economy, and this led inter 
alia to a system of ideological homogenization in all schools, colleges and 
universities (3): there were no confessional schools; nor was there any religious 
education in schools. 
School education 
Ideological homogenization began even in pre-school education, in the state or 
state-company-runKiitdergiirten which, in 1987, were attended by 93 per cent of 
age cohort. One of the aims of pre-school instruction was: “To pre.pare for 
learning in school and to make initial acquaintance with socialist life and the 
activities of working people (4).” Another: “To educate children to love their 
socialist home and to love peace (5).” This was achieved in the preschool 
curriculum by learning about feast days and holidays, especially those related to 
the birthdays of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and leading politicians, and 
by promoting contacts to state-owned companies, party representatives, and the 
German People’s Army. 
Indoctrination continued in the so-called Polytechnic School, attended by all 
children from the’age of six to sixteen (see Figure 1). This school was viewed 
throughout the county? as a pre-selection stage for the trade or profession to be 
chosen. Closely linked to its godfather company, with 80 per cent of pupils doing 
voluntary work in the factory during school holidays, one of the main aims of the 
school was to contribute to the development of the rounded socialist personality. 
Figure 1: Structure of the Education System in East Germany 
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In the Polytechnic School, particular emphasis was placed on the communication 
of work virtues and the specific socialist attitude to work. One of the ways in 
which it was hoped to achieve such was via the system of work instruction which 
permeated the whole curriculum (6). In classes one to three, all pupils were 
required to work in the school garden; in classes four to six, they were expected 
to acquire knowledge of materials and gain their initial experience in technical 
modelling; in classes seven to eight, technical drawing was introduced and 
accompanied by light work in the godfather company; in classes nine to ten, the 
final two classes of obligatory school attendance, theoretical instruction in 
economic socialism and socialist production methods was complemented by 
actual manufacturing work in the factory. 
Other features of the Polytechnic School designed to inculcate the work ethic 
and its relationship with socialism were the six-day week for all school children 
(214 days per annum) and the insistence throughout the system on Russian as the 
first foreign language. Russian was learned from the fifth class onwards (7). 
Entry to the Extended Polytechnic School, the East German equivalent of the 
Sixth Form in England and Wales, was restricted by the state to eight per cent of 
age cohort. The Abitur, the German counterpart of ‘A’ levels, was taken at the 
age of 19. The subjects studied were German language and literature, 
Mathematics, Russian Sport, and Physics or Chemistry or Biology. 
Vocational training 
Very few youngsters in former East Germany failed to take an apprenticeship. 
According to the state, “All young people have the right and duty to learn a 
profession (S).” Thus, after completing the tenth class in the Polytechnic School, 
87 per cent of age cohort went through a two-year apprenticeship, with 85 per 
cent of these young people signing an apprenticeship contract on first 
application, usually with the school’s godfather factory (9). Not only was the 
practical work done in this factory, but the vocational school where the theory 
was learned actually belonged to the godfather company. 
It was possible for the more gifted to embark upon a three-year apprenticeship 
after the tenth class, leading to the twin qualifications of skilled worker 
(Fachrbeiterj and the Abitur. Six per cent of all pupils took this route, which 
could lead to university, or one of the 88 engineering schools, or alternatively 
one of the seven economics schools (Fachxizulen). The final qualification here 
was the approximate equivalent of technician status. 
In theory, all pupils having completed the tenth class had some 238 trades and 
professions from which to select an apprenticeship. But the 300 state combines 
and approximately 8,000 companies, either vertically or horizontally integrated 
into these combines, were responsible for their own recruiting. In practice, 
therefore, the choice was more restricted for both the two groups above. The 
options were even more limited for a third group, the less gifted, who started a 
four-year apprenticeship after the eighth class: they had only 63 professions to 
choose from. 98 per cent of all apprentices passed their final examination (10). 
Tertiary-level education 
Studies at the six universities and nine technological universities, the nine 
engineering colleges and two economics colleges (Hochschulen),’ all of which 
were controlled by the state, were held to be a high social distinction and the 
personal duty of the student to the working class and the state (11). Access to 
tertiary level education was on the one hand structurally determined by the 
economic and social needs of the state, i.e. study places at universities and 
colleges were allocated according to state economic plans. On the other, access 
was personally determined by the aspiring student in the form of political loyalty 
(membership of the Free German Youth movement) and by readiness to defend 
East German society (12). Tertiary-level studies for males were thus much 
facilitated by ‘volunteering’ for three years’ military service in the German 
People’s Army, as opposed to eighteen months, which was the regular 
conscription period. The ratio of tertiary-level places to applicants in the 1980s 
was 1:1.4. 
All studies at university or college, except medicine, lasted four to four and a half 
years. Common to all, including medicine, was a three-year compulsory study of 
Marxism-Leninism, with a fourth year elective on offer; two years of further 
instruction in Russian and one other foreign language, usually English, were also 
compulsory; as were sports studies for males and females; and military studies 
for men, with civil defence training for women (13). 
By the end of the 198Os, a dual system had established itself in tertiary education: 
the universities and technological universities provided the people for top 
management functions in all aspects of the state; the engineering and economics 
colleges provided the technical or back-up staff. Expressed in quasi-Marxist 
terms, then, most engineers and technicians formed a middle layer between the 
intelligentsia and the working class (14). 
Management development in East Germany 
It was, therefore, the members of the intelligentsia who took over not only the 
running of the state, the party, its central planning institutions, but also its 
combines and their associated companies. Indeed, the strict, closed hierarchy of 
the Nomenclazura system in this supposedly classless society was even extended 
to the system of development for all managers in former East Germany. 
It is clear from Figure 2 that the topmost echelons of society, Nomenchtura I, 
received their management development at the elite Central Institute for the 
Socialist Economic Experience, which was founded in 1965. Nomenclatura II 
had to be content with what the Institutes for the Socialist Economic Experience 
(ISEE) attached to the fourteen industry ministries had to offer (15). These 
ministries often worked in close association with the universities and the 
engineering colleges in the provision of management development. The 
universities and colleges were responsible for approximately 20 per cent of 
overall development training. Nomenclatura III were catered for by the 150 so- 
called Combine Academies for the Socialist Economic Experience and 
Nomenclatzua N by the Company Academies. These institutions provided some 
60 per cent of management development (16). 
Figure 2: Management Development System in East Germany 
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The nature of management 
Again it is ironic that, in the egalitarian society which the former East German 
state was purportedly attempting to achieve, the management system which 
emerged was strictly of the one-man variety. This is nowhere better typified than 
by the directors general of the state-owned combines (see Figure 3). 
These directors general had arguably more power than the presidents of 
companies in the United States. Eight of the economic overlords sat on the 
party’s central committee from 1986. They were thus even more influential than 
the industry ministers to whom they reported because some of these industry 
ministers were not members of the central committee (17). 
The elevated position of the directors general enabled them to influence the 
economic plan for their particular combine. It also gave them the freedom to 
break many of the stultifying rules and regulations and to cut red tape. Above 
all, however, their membership of the central committee afforded them priority 
in the allocation of precious resources and access to hard currency. 
Figure 3: The Management Hierarchy in East Germany 
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worn by the company firemen. They could change m iddle-level managers, create 
new divisions, shift the site of production from one company in the combine to 
another, or effect inter-combine transfers of machinery (18). Although they 
were obliged to present a monthly progress report to all employees at the parent 
plant and had to meet regularly with the trade union and local party officials, it 
was usually not in the interest of the latter two bodies to probe too deeply into 
the actions of their director general. 
Enjoying great social prestige within the country, not only on the basis of their 
positions but also by their personal-achievements, observers in the west were 
occasionally taken aback by some of the pronouncements by the directors 
general. One example will suffice. Reporting on the zero defects drive within 
his combine, W o lfgang Jacob stated: “Step by step we want to make EAW- 
Electronic into a name familiar all over the world: a watchword for quality 
everywhere. Like Zeiss, Lada or Coca-Cola.” (19) 
M iddle managers? 
The ‘m iddle managers’ in the former East German system (Nomencfatura II> 
could be defined as a substantial layer of professionally-qualified, but for the 
most part ideologically-detached officials. They had sought relatively high 
positions in order to fulfil personal ambitions and to receive the perquisites of 
life on the Nomendatura ladder. 
Perhaps the term ‘m iddle managers’ is inappropriate for this stratum of society; 
in reality, they were but higher industrial functionaries. Their power was 
constrained not only by the one-man management practices of their directors 
general, and by the trade unions, but by the realities of commercial life within 
the system. Profits were only regarded as genuine if earned within the 
regulations of the state-determined economic plan; profits could only be made by 
cutting costs and not by raising prices; profits were retained partly by the 
companies and partly by the combines. The rest went to the state (20). 
These functionaries were usually not permitted to shop around in order to lower 
their costs: raw materials had to be bought in at prices laid down by the state; 
semi-finished products, possibly from another company within the combine, had 
to be purchased at cost-levels determined outside their sphere of influence. 
In other words, these people did not manage: they functioned by taking orders 
from above and executing them. They had just one boss - their immediate 
superior (21). 
East German managers in the east 
In the past two years, approximately 500,000 citizens of former East Germany 
have emigrated to West Germany. Not many of them are managers. 
The managers remaining in the east are to a large extent disillusioned with post- 
reunification developments. They claim that they ‘must have done something 
right’ from 1945 to 1990. Apart from helping to build the show-case economy of 
the Eastern bloc countries, they protest that East Germany was the best of the 
COMECON countries in automation, robotics, microelectronics, computer 
hardware and optics. They met their targets in the past, and now the West 
Germans are coming along, closing down their companies and telling them that 
they have been doing it ail wrong! 
There is a widespread lack of confidence among the former managerial strata. 
Many former managers have been dismissed, especially top party officials and 
members of the St& (state security police) (22). Others have been fired or 
demoted for incompetence by western firms taking over companies in the 
eastern part of Germany. There have been wholesale removals of personnel 
managers, who were widely regarded by the workforce as local party spies. 
Accountants have suffered in particular because of their ignorance of market 
economy techniques. But many sales managers have been retained because of 
their deep acquaintance of, and contact with, markets in eastern European 
countries. 
East German managers in the west 
Of the former East German managers emigrating to the west, the engineers have 
the best chances of success - but as engineers, not as managers. 
Since reunification, many East German engineers have been recruited by West 
German companies in an effort to meet skills shortages. Yet these companies 
are often dissatisfied with their new staff. Complaints abound that their 
technical competence is the equivalent of only g-bit technology (in 1981, IBM 
introduced a 16-bit computer). Moreover, the training of these engineers, it is 
claimed, is too narrow because it was specifically related to the needs of their 
former combines. Finally, the engineers tend to see only production problems 
and fail to heed the needs of the market (24). 
Interpersonal skills are reported to be hardly developed among former East 
German engineers. Their attitude to their superiors is one of blind obedience. 
They commonly assume that the boss must be better informed; knowledge is 
power; therefore the boss is always right. Moreover, it is claimed that engineers 
from the east are unable to work successfully in teams because they are 
incapable of motivating people. Motivation was not regarded as a management 
task in former East Germany, where orders came from the top down. According 
to Giinter Steinbach, personnel specialist at Siemens, these engineers are “totally 
unsuited to management tasks (23).” 
Conclusion 
In 1990, an attempt was made by Miilder & Partner, management consultants, to 
ascertain whether, despite all the fragmentary evidence to date, there was an 
untapped pool of top management talent in the east of the reunited country. 250 
East German managers were surveyed for their suitability as management board 
members in West German companies. The finding was that only seven would 
qualify (24). 
The other 243 would fail in the west on account of their lack of market 
knowledge, lack of confidence, lack of creativity, lack of initiative and lack of 
mental flexibility. Although some of the candidates possessed positive qualities, 
the most outstanding of which were intelligence, motivation and a talent for 
improvisation, far too many had been scarred by the system. 
Even the seven successful candidates, however, would face an uphill task, not 
least from their peers in the west. They would encounter an acceptability 
problem because of the widespread conviction abroad in West Germany today 
that: “Ossis (East Germans) are all turncoats: yesterday Karl Marx; tomorrow 
Adam Smith.” 
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